↓ has been introduced as an institution for the development of reactive systems based on model class semantics. The satisfaction relation of this logic was, however, not abstract enough to enjoy the modal invariance property (bisimilar models should satisfy the same sentences). We recently overcame this problem by proposing an observational satisfaction relation where the equality on states is interpreted by bisimilarity of states. This entailed, however, a price to pay -the satisfaction condition required for institutions was lost. This paper works on this limitation by establishing a behavioural semantics for D ↓ parametric to behavioural structures -families of equivalence relations on the states of each model. Such structures are taken in consideration in the signature category and, in particular, for the definition of signature morphisms. We show that with these changes we get again an institution with a behavioural model class semantics. The framework is instantiated with specific behavioural structures, resulting in the novel Institution of Crucial Actions.
Introduction
This paper deals with logical formalisms for the specification and development of reactive systems. Dynamic logic with binders, called D ↓ -logic, has been introduced in [13] as an institution in the sense of [6] which allows expressing properties of reactive systems, from abstract safety and liveness requirements down to concrete specifications of the (recursive) structure of executable processes. It is therefore well suited for program development by stepwise refinement. D ↓ -logic combines modalities indexed by regular expressions of actions, as in Dynamic Logic [10] , and state variables with binders, as in Hybrid Logic [4] . These motivations are reflected in its semantics. Differently from what is usual in modal logics, whose semantics is given by Kripke structures and satisfaction of formulas is evaluated globally, D ↓ models are reachable, labelled transition systems with initial states where satisfaction is evaluated. This reflects our focus on computations, i.e. on effective processes.
Motivation
The commitment of D ↓ -logic concerning bisimulation equivalence is, however, not satisfactory: the model class semantics of specifications in D ↓ is not closed under bisimulation equivalence; there are D ↓ -sentences that distinguish bisimulation equivalent models, i.e., D ↓ does not enjoy the modal invariance property. As an example consider the two models N and M in Fig. 1 and the sentence ↓ x. a x. This sentence, evaluated in the initial state, expresses that after executing the action a the initial state is reached again. Obviously this is true for N but not for M though N and M are bisimulation equivalent.
Fig. 1. Bisimilar models
As a way out, we have proposed D ↓ ∼ -logic [12] which relaxes the satisfaction relation such that equality of states is interpreted by bisimilarity of states. We call this observational equality and denote it by ∼ M for each model M. Then the model M in Fig. 1 satisfies observationally the sentence ↓ x. a x, denoted by M |= ∼ ↓ x. a x, since the two states w 0 and w 1 are observationally equal. Indeed we have shown in [12] that in D ↓ ∼ the modal invariance property holds. But, unfortunately, with relaxing the satisfaction relation we lost the institution property of D ↓ because D ↓ ∼ does not satisfy the satisfaction condition of an institution. Intuitively the satisfaction condition expresses that truth is invariant under change of notation [6] . From the software engineer's perspective it expresses that satisfaction of properties, i.e. sentences, should be preserved when models are put in a larger context. Figure 2 illustrates the problem with D ↓ ∼ .
Fig. 2. Examples of {a} and {a, b}-models
It shows two models M and M . The signature of M is the singleton action set A = {a} and the signature of M is the larger action set A = {a, b}. As a signature morphism we take the inclusion σ : A → A with σ(a) = a. Looking at M we see that w 0 and w 1 are not observationally equal, since in w 0 the action b is enabled which is not the case in state w 1 . Hence, M |= ∼ ↓ x. a x. Restricting M to A yields the A-model M. As we have seen before M |= ∼ ↓ x. a x. Hence, observational satisfaction is not preserved in larger contexts and therefore the satisfaction condition does not hold in D ↓ ∼ . In this work, we are looking for possibilities to overcome this deficiency.
Overview of the Proposal
On the way to solve the problem we found (again) the paper of Misiak [15] who has studied institutions with behavioural semantics in arbitrary logical systems with concrete model categories. Misiak's paper is an abstraction of more concrete institutions that have been studied in the framework of observational algebraic specification where a similar problem to ours was solved by adding restrictions to signature morphisms [5, 7] and putting more information into the signatures [3, 8, 11] . To instantiate Misiak's approach by using labelled transition systems as models, we forget, for the moment, the observational equalities ∼ M and consider instead, for each set of actions A, a family ≈ of equivalence relations ≈ M , indexed by the models of D ↓ . A signature is then a pair (A, ≈) and the satisfaction of sentences is defined by interpreting equality of states in terms of ≈ M . Misiak's trick is to consider a signature morphism as a mapping σ : A → A which is compatible with the equivalences of each signature. This means, more formally, that for each A -model M the restriction of ≈ M to the states of M, denoted by (≈ M )| σ , is the same as the equivalence ≈ (M |σ) used in ≈ for the A-model M | σ , which is the reduct of M along σ. This means that we have, for each A -model M , the following crucial equation:
Thus the satisfaction condition is enforced by the notion of a signature morphism and we may ask how useful this additional information in signatures, given by the family of equivalences, can be for our problem. In particular, how the family of equivalences can be syntactically presented and how this can be related to the observational equalities ∼ M considered in D ↓ ∼ . To approach this, we first observe that Misiak has reduced the model classes for signatures (A, ≈) to those models M for which the equivalence ≈ M is a congruence.
1 In our framework of labelled transition systems this makes perfect sense, since the congruence property expresses that equivalence of states must be preserved when an action a ∈ A is executed. In this way we obtain an institution. We also consider the "black-box" view of each (A, ≈)-model M obtained by its quotient structure M/≈ M . We show that this construction can be extended to a full and faithfull functor mapping (A, ≈)-models to A-models in D ↓ . This functor preserves and reflects satisfaction of sentences.
Next we are looking for a meaningful syntactic representation of signatures (A, ≈). The idea comes from the observational algebraic specification frameworks [3, 8, 11] where a distinguished subset of so-called observer operations has been selected for each signature. In our context of labelled transition systems we select, for each action set A, a distinguished subset C ⊆ A of crucial actions and consider two states equivalent w.r. is therefore restricted to those labelled transition systems for which the set of crucial actions is already sufficient to characterize the observational equality, i.e. bisimilarity of states. This has the side effect that for proving that two states are bisimilar it is sufficient to check transitions with actions from C, a technique which has also been proposed in the selective μ-calculus [2] to reduce verification complexity for modal formulae.
Having signatures as pairs (A, C), it remains to define signature morphisms σ : (A, C) → (A , C ) such that the Eq. (1) 
such that for each morphism ϕ : Σ → Σ ∈ Sign I , the satisfaction condition
holds for each M ∈ |Mod I (Σ )| and ρ ∈ Sen I (Σ).
Dynamic Logics with Binders
This section recalls the underlying definitions and facts of D ↓ -logic introduced in [13] and its observational variant D ↓ ∼ introduced in [12] . While D ↓ is an institution, D ↓ ∼ is not as explained before.
D ↓ -Logic
Signatures for D ↓ are finite sets A of atomic actions, and a signature morphism 
The class of A-models and A-model morphisms define a category denoted by Mod

Definition 2 (Model reduct). Let A
σ / / A be a signature morphism and
The reduct | σ induces, for each signature morphism σ : 
Definition 3 (Formulas and sentences). The set of A-formulas Fm
where x ∈ X, for X an infinite set of variables, and actions are composed from atomic actions a ∈ A by sequential composition choice and iteration:
-formula ϕ is called an A-sentence if ϕ contains no free variables. Free variables are defined as usual with ↓ being the unique operator binding variables. The set of A-sentences is denoted by Sen
The binder operator ↓ x.ϕ assigns to the variable x the current state of evaluation and evaluates ϕ. The operator @ x ϕ evaluates ϕ in the state assigned to x.
Each signature morphism σ : A → A can be extended to a formula translation functionσ : Fm
, that keeps variables and connectives and replaces each action a by σ(a). If we restrictσ to sentences we get the translation function Sen
Hence we have the sentence functor Sen
maps each signature to the set of its sentences, and each signature morphism to the corresponding translation of sentences.
To define the satisfaction relation formally we need to clarify how composed actions are interpreted in models. Let α ∈ Act(A) and M ∈ Mod 
Finally, as shown in [13] , the satisfaction condition holds and therefore these ingredients constitute an institution in the sense of Goguen and Burstall [6] : 
Theorem 1 (Satisfaction condition). For any signature morphism
A novelty of this model category is that isomorphism corresponds to bisimulation equivalence of models (see [12] ). The observational satisfaction relation M, g, w |= ∼ ϕ is defined exactly as |= with the exception of the satisfaction for variables which relaxes their interpretation up to observational equality, i.e., for any valuation g and state w,
These two adjustments on D ↓ ensure that D ↓ ∼ has the Hennessy-Milner property: Modal invariance holds w.r.t. |= ∼ and two image-finite models satisfying w.r.t. |= ∼ the same sentences are bisimulation equivalent; see [12] . However, as illustrated in Sect. 1.1, the satisfaction condition does not hold in D 
Behavioural Institution
To get a behavioural institution we use the ideas of Misiak [15] who has studied institutions with behavioural semantics in arbitrary logical systems with concrete model categories. More specifically, our model categories will contain as objects A-models, i.e. transition systems with labels from A. The behavioural semantics introduced in this section is not committed to the observational equality but, following Misiak's idea, to an arbitrary family of equivalence relations, called behavioural structure. It should however be pointed out that, in contrast to Misiak's approach, we can define an explicit satisfaction relation here due to the specific model category of labeled transition systems. 
Definition 7 ((A, ≈)-Models and their morphisms). An
A-model M ∈ Mod D ↓ (A) is an (A, ≈)-model if ≈ M is a
Proof. We have to prove that
where (1) 
The next theorem is the key to get the satisfaction relation. It relies on the definition of behavioural signature morphisms.
Theorem 2. Let σ : (A, ≈) → (A , ≈ ) be a signature morphism and M
= (W , w 0 , R ) ∈ Mod B (A , ≈ ). Then, for any w ∈ W | σ (⊆ W ), for any valuation g : X → W | σ ,
and for any A-formula ϕ,
Proof. The proof is done by induction on the structure of formulas. We consider below atomic formulas x, ↓ x.ϕ and α ϕ. Actually, cases α ϕ and [α]ϕ are proved similarly, and the remaining cases are trivial.
In the sequel we denote Mod
Case ↓ x.ϕ:
For the step ( ) we just have to observe that for any action α ∈ Act(A),
This can be easily seen by induction on the structure of actions: The property holds by definition for basic actions a ∈ A. We consider below sequential composition of actions (α; α ); the remaining cases follow a similar argument. So, we have
For the converse direction:
Corollary 1 (Satisfaction condition). Let σ : (A, ≈) → (A , ≈ ) be a signature morphism and M
Proof. This proof follows directly from Theorem 2: the satisfaction of sentences does not depend on the valuations (all the variables are bound and hence, their interpretation is determined by the model). Thus, for any state
With the last corollary we have all ingredients to define the behavioural institution:
Black-Box Functor
The black-box view of an (A, ≈)-model M is an A-model that represents the behaviour of M from the user's point of view. This model that collapses everything that is identified by ≈ M , abstracting distinctions between states related by ≈ M , is build via quotient construction. In this section we extend this construction to a full and faithful functor that maps each (A, ≈)-model into (an A-model representing) its black-box view. Finally we show that this functor preserves and reflects satisfaction of sentences.
Definition 9. Let
M = (W, w 0 , R) be an (A, ≈)-model. The quotient of M, denoted by M/ ≈ M , is the A-model (W/ ≈ M , [w 0 ] ≈M , R/ ≈ M ), where W/≈ M = {[w] ≈M |w ∈ W } with [w] ≈M = {w ∈ W |w ≈ M w } and (R/≈ M ) a = {([w] ≈M , [v] ≈M ) | there exist w ∈ [w] ≈M and v ∈ [v] ≈M s.t. (w, v) ∈ R a }.
Remark 1. For any a ∈ A and w, v
This follows from the (zig) property of ∼ M . This fact can be generalised to composed actions α ∈ Act(A).
Definition 10. The Black Box map is defined as the pair of maps BB
As usual, we omit in the sequel the subscripts in BB. Proof. We have to show that, for any observational morphisms h, h : M → M , BB h = BB h implies h = h . In view of contradiction, let us suppose that BB h = BB h and h = h . Then, there is a pair (w, w ) such that (w, w ) ∈ h and (w, w ) ∈ h (or vice-versa). By BB definition we have (
Theorem 4. Black box is a functor BB : Mod
Hence, there is an r ∈ [w] ≈M and r ∈ [w ] ≈ M such that (r, r ) ∈ h . Since r ≈ M w and h is a morphism, we have by 3 of Definition 4 that (w, r ) ∈ h . Moreover, since r ≈ M w , we have by 4 of Definition 4 that (w, w ) ∈ h , what contradicts our initial assumption. Therefore h = h .
Proof. Implication '⇒' holds since BB is a functor. Implication '⇐' is entailed because BB is a full and faithful functor
In the remainder of this section we show that the functor BB preserves and reflects satisfaction. This result is a simple generalisation of Theorem 5 in [12] .
Theorem 8. For any model M ∈ Mod
B (A, ≈) and for any A-sentence ϕ,
Proof. For the proof we show, more generally, that for any w ∈ W , valuation g : X → W and A-formula ϕ,
The proof can be performed by induction over the structure of A-formulas. For the base formulas ϕ = x, we have:
For the case ϕ = α φ, we have:
Step : The direction "⇒" is trivial using v = v and the Induction Hypothesis.
The remaining cases are straightforward.
Institution of Crucial Actions
This section introduces the "Logic of Crucial Actions". We show that this logic is a specific institution of observational dynamic logic with binders, inheriting the whole theory developed in the previous sections. The crucial idea to do this is to define signatures and signature morphisms syntactically and to relate them to behavioural signatures and behavioural signature morphisms as considered in Sect. 3. An important extra ingredient is that the restriction of A-models to those on which the given equivalences are congruences will yield, in the case of crucial actions signatures, exactly observational equalities. Thus, by applying the results of Sect. 
Lemma 4. Crucial action signatures with their morphisms define a category. This category will be denoted by Sign
Cr . by forgetting the second component of the signatures. Now, we define a variant of bisimulation on A-models which takes into account only crucial actions in C. In the particular case where C = A we get the usual notion of (strong) bisimulation. 
Definition 12 (Crucial actions bisimulation). Let (A, C) be a crucial actions signature and let
M = (W, w 0 , R) be an A-model. An (A, C)-bisimulation on M = (W, w 0 , R) is a relation B ⊆ W × W such that (w 0 , w 0 ) ∈ B and (zig) For any c ∈ C, w, v, w ∈ W such that (w, w ) ∈ B, if (w, v) ∈ R c , then there is a v ∈ W such that (w , v ) ∈ R c and (v, v ) ∈ B. (zag) For any c ∈ C, w, v, v ∈ W such that (w, w ) ∈ B, if (w , v ) ∈ R c , then there is a v ∈ W such that (w, v) ∈ R c and (v, v ) ∈ B.
Definition 13 ((A, C)-Equality). Let (A, C) be a crucial actions signature. For any
A-model M the (A, C)-equality on M is the relation ∼ C M ⊆ W × W such that, for any w, w , w ∼ C M w iff there is an (A, C)-bisimulation B in M such that (w, w ) ∈ B.
Definition 14 ((A, C)-Models). A model M ∈ Mod
bisimulation containing w and w (its existence is assured by w ∼ C M w ). Again, since for any c ∈ C, (R | σ ) c = R σ(c) , and σ[C] = C , we have that B satisfies the conditions of (A , C )-bisimulation. We have also that W | σ is closed by A-
As a direct consequence of this lemma we have the following result:
As a consequence of the last corollary and Lemma 3 we get the functor Mod Cr : (Sign Cr ) op → Cat. Next, by taking |= (A,C) as the satisfaction relation |= (A,∼ C ) and instantiating Corollary 1 we have: Example 3. Coming back to the example considered in Sect. 1 we want to emphasise that the problem considered there does not apply anymore, if we consider the crucial actions signature morphism σ : ({a}, {a}) → ({a, b}, {a}) with σ(a) = a. Then, the structure M in Fig. 2 is not an ({a, b}, {a})-model, as explained above, and therefore the reduct w.r.t. σ is not meaningful in the crucial actions institution. The situation is different, however, if we consider the model M of 
Conclusion and Future Work
The observational logic with binders D ↓ was suggested in [13] as a suitable formalism to develop reactive systems. This research was pursued in [12] with the introduction of an alternative semantics for D ↓ , endowing it with modal invariance. However, with this accommodation, the satisfaction condition was lost, i.e. unlike the original D ↓ , this new logic is not an institution. The present paper works on this handicap. As done in the context of the observational semantics (see [15] ) we adopted behavioural structures -families of equivalence relations on the states of each model -as behavioural interpretations of the equalities on the states. Then, by adjusting the morphisms of the category of signatures (as done in [3, 7, 15] ) the (standard) reduct works properly to assure the satisfaction condition. Under this abstract setting, the black-box functor was defined and the relation between the strict satisfaction of D ↓ and the observational ones of D ↓ ∼ was established. Finally, an interesting instantiation of this generic institution was presented -the Crucial Actions Institution. These efforts on the parametrization of the logic with generic observational structures (i), as well on the adjustment of D ↓ ∼ to recover the institutional nature of D ↓ (ii) would be worthy explored in the future. Concerning the direction (i), we are looking for a specific observational structure (maybe combined with some slight adaptations of D ↓ ∼ ) to deal with (internal) τ -transitions (e.g. [9, 14] [13] (currently in revision process). On the direction (ii), it would be interesting to explore the 'once and for all' techniques and results established for generic institutions. In this view, the use and characterisation of the Casl-in-the-large specification constructors [1] in D ↓ ∼ specifications, as well as the integration of these institutions in HETS [16] , could provide appropriate conditions to make D ↓ ∼ (and D ↓ ) an effective formal method for reactive systems development.
